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Responsibility over some aspects of the benefits system and also the programmes that 
provide support to benefit recipients seeking work will be devolved to Scotland in April 
2017. This is part of a broader devolution package recommended by the Smith Commission 
and made law in the form of the Scotland Act (2016) in March this year. 
From then, the Scottish Parliament will replacĞƚŚĞh<ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐtŽƌŬWƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞĂŶĚ
Work Choice schemes. Currently, benefit recipients can be referred to the Work Programme 
ŽŶĂŵĂŶĚĂƚŽƌǇďĂƐŝƐ ?ĂŶĚƐĂŶĐƚŝŽŶƐĂƉƉůŝĞĚƚŽƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚƐ ?ďĞŶĞĨŝƚƐŝĨƚŚĞǇƌĞĨƵƐĞƚŽƚĂŬĞ
part, or are deemed not to be sufficiently engaging with the support offered. 
There is a wealth of evidence to suggest that benefit sanctions have increased hardship; 
ĨƵĞůůĞĚƚŚĞŶĞĞĚĨŽƌĨŽŽĚďĂŶŬƐ ?ǁŽƌƐĞŶĞĚƐĂŶĐƚŝŽŶĞĚĐůĂŝŵĂŶƚƐ ?ŚĞĂůƚŚ ?ĂŶĚĂůůƚŚŝƐǁŚŝůƐƚ
having limited positive impact on helping claimants return to work. 
Whilst the sanctions regime will remain a reserved matter, this report makes the argument 
that devolution of responsibility for employment programmes means that the Scottish 
Parliament can significantly reduce the level of sanctioning in Scotland and ensure that no 
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Employment Programmes and Sanctions in Scotland 
Several different UK programmes provide employment support to Scots who receive non-
employment benefits.  The Work Programme and Work Choice are the two largest 
programmes, the former being aimed at all non-employed benefit recipients, and the latter 
ŚĞůƉŝŶŐĚŝƐĂďůĞĚũŽďƐĞĞŬĞƌƐŽŶůǇ ?dŚĞtŽƌŬWƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞŝƐŵĂŶĚĂƚŽƌǇĨŽƌĂůů:ŽďƐĞĞŬĞƌ ?Ɛ
Allowance (JSA) and some Universal Credit recipients, whilst Employment and Support 
Allowance (ESA) recipients classed as capable of 'Work Related Activity' are also expected to 
participate as a condition of receiving their benefit. Work Choice is a voluntary programme. 
JSA and Universal Credit recipients can also be mandated to a range of other schemes which 
run outside the Work Programme and Work Choice. These include Help to Work; Skills 
Conditionality and, until February 2016, Mandatory Work Activity. 
In all, there have been over 200,000 mandatory referrals to UK employment programmes 
since 2011.  
Table 1. Scottish mandatory referrals to employment programmes, June 2011 ʹ latest data 
Scheme Mandatory participants (% 
of total referrals) 
Work Programme1 159,924 (90%) 
Mandatory Work Activity2 28,030 (100%) 
Skills Conditionality3 12,620 (100%)4 
Help to Work5 24,200 (100%) 
 
Sanctions applied through these programmes numbered around 79,000 in the same period, 
accounting for around 22% of all sanctions applied in Scotland (See Table 2). This averages 
around 13,000 sanctions a year. 
Table 2. Sanctions made in connection to employment programmes, Scottish JSA and ESA 
recipients, January 2010 ʹ December 20156  
Year Total number of 
sanctions 
% of total sanctions 
2010 8537 15% 
2011 7596 14% 
2012 15559 21% 
2013 25744 30% 
2014 13741 24% 
2015 7921 29% 
                                                          
1 DWP Stat-Xplore, Work Programme Referrals dataset. Data for June 2011 ʹ December 2015. 
2 DWP (2016). Data tables: Mandatory Programmes official statistics: May 2011 to February 2016. Sheet 2.1 
3 ibid. Sheet 4.1. Data for May 2011  W February 2016. 
4 Skills Conditionality is mandatory but sanctions are not enforced in Scotland. 
5 DWP (2016). Tables: Quarterly Help to Work statistics to March 2016. Sheet 2. Data for April 2014 ʹ March 
2015 
6 DWP Stat-Xplore, JSA and ESA individual sanctions datasets. Data for January 2010 ʹ December 2015. 
The case against sanctions for employment programme participants 
Does compulsory participation in employment programmes increase employment? 
The past two decades have seen some level of mandatory participation become a more 
common feature of employment programmes, which also have been extended to a greater 
proportion of the working-age benefit recipient population. Most programmes in the 1990s 
and 2000s required at least some participation in Work-Focused Interviews, with this later 
being extended to ongoing participation over a matter of months or years, and also to some 
groups that had previously had little or no requirement to take-up offers of support, in 
particular non-employed sick and disabled people. 
Despite this, the evidence that mandatory schemes have a positive impact on helping 
people into employment is limited. Whilst there is relatively extensive evidence to suggest 
ƚŚĂƚĐŽŵƉƵůƐŽƌǇƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŽŶŚĂƐĂ ?ĚĞƚĞƌƌĞŶƚ ?Žƌ ?ƚŚƌĞĂƚ ?ĞĨĨĞĐƚǁŚĞƌĞďǇƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚƐǁŝůůĨŝŶĚ
work or otherwise cease their benefit claim in order to avoid conditionality, there is much 
less evidence to suggest that positive impacts on getting participants into work are 
sustained.  
Summarising a wide range of studies, Eichorst, Werner and Konle-Seidl argue:  
Some studies point at the fact that activating interventions based on the threat potential and 
demanding principle may help move benefit recipients to low-skill, low-pay and instable jobs 
so that they run the risk of continued partial reliance or repeated return to benefits7. 
dŚĞh< ?ƐDĂŶĚĂƚŽƌǇtŽƌŬĐƚŝǀŝƚǇ ?Dt ?clearly reflects this tendency. A National Institute 
for Economic and Social Research review of a DWP evaluation of MWA found that: 
Among those who did actually start the progamme, there was essentially no impact. And 
while there was a substantial impact on those who didn't start - as you would expect, given 
that the programme was compulsory and they could be sanctioned for non-attendance - this 
was transitory.  Overall, the maximum impact was a 5 percentage point reduction in benefit 
receipt, and only 13 weeks after starting the programme the impact had disappeared 
completely. On average, someone referred to MWA spent just 4 days less on benefit as a 
result8. 
On the contrary, MWA appears to have moved some claimants further away from work, 
increasing the likelihood that participants would claim benefits for sick and disabled people. 
The same review found that; 
13 weeks after referral, those referred were 3 percentage points more likely to be on 
ESA.  Not to put too fine a point on it, this is a complete policy disaster. ESA claimants are 
both more expensive and more difficult to get off benefit than JSA claimants. Indeed, the main 
thrust of welfare-to-work policy under both this government and the previous one has been to 
                                                          
7 Eichhorst, Werner, Otto Kaufmann, and Regina Konle-Seidl, eds. 2008.  Bringing the jobless into work?: 
experiences with activation schemes in Europe and the US. Springer Science & Business Media. 
8 Portes (2012). DWP analysis shows mandatory work activity is largely ineffective. Government is therefore 
extending it. NIESR: http://www.niesr.ac.uk/blog/dwp-analysis-shows-mandatory-work-activity-largely-
ineffective-government-therefore-extending#.V6Hx8xUrK70  
try to move ESA claimants closer to the labour market.  MWA appears to achieve precisely 
the opposite9. 
Given that participants will not in most cases start Scottish employment programmes until a 
year or more of employment, it is worth highlighting that the limited positive impacts noted 
earlier in this section tend to be concentrated in the earlier stages of benefit conditionality 
being applied. At the point of entrance to Scottish programmes, however, benefit recipients 
will already have been under the threat of sanctions for some considerable length of time. 
Mandating participation in Scottish programmes is therefore unlikely to lead to one of the 
few positive outcomes for which there is strong evidence. 
Aside from the deterrent effect, there is little evidence the compulsory participation in 
employment programmes leads to positive change in the behaviour of participants. This has 
been the finding10 of the recent Welfare Conditionality: Sanctions, Support and Behaviour 
Change project, which conducted 500 interviews with benefit recipients and stakeholders in 
both England and Scotland. This replicates similar findings in earlier studies11. 
Another issue to consider when assessing the justifiability of sanctions is the likelihood that 
compulsory participation will help the participant into work. sĂŶĞƌƐĐŚŽƚ ?Ɛ12 
proportionality principle suggests that compulsory participation in employment 
programmes is only justifiable when there is a reasonable chance of it having the desired 
effect. Around 2/3 of participants leave the Work Programme not having gained and stayed 
in a job for at least 3 or 6 months13, and this figure is considerably lower for participants 
with health conditions or disabilities14. As reported above, the likelihood of success is even 
lower for other schemes.  
If the purpose of sanctions is to help benefit recipients into work by enforcing participation 
in employment programmes and if recipients go through such programmes at risk of a 
sanction  W with around 10% likely to be sanctioned  W and those programmes are unlikely, in 
some cases very unlikely, to help them, then the whole basis of the sanctions regime is 
brought into very serious and fundamental question. 
  
                                                          
9 ibid 
10 Welfare Conditionality (2016). First Wave Findings: Overview http://www.welfareconditionality.ac.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2016/05/WelCond-findings-Overview-May16.pdf  
11 Griggs and Evans (2010). A Review of Benefit Sanctions. CPAG. 
https://www.jrf.org.uk/file/40752/download?token=0ZlhZ_yT 
12 Van Aerschot, P. (2016). Activation policies and the protection of individual rights: A critical assessment of 
the situation in Denmark, Finland and Sweden. Routledge. 




Other impacts of compulsory employment programme participation and sanctions 
In addition to limited positive effects, negative impacts on debt and health and wellbeing of 
participation in work-related activity enforced by sanctions have been widely observed: 
x Health: ,ĂůĞ ?Ɛ15 survey of 500 ESA claimants being supported on the Work 
Programme found that 61% said participation had worsened their health condition. 
Participants with mental health conditions were the most likely to report a negative 
impact on their health. 
x Hunger: A joint report from the Trussell Trust, the Church of England, and the 
charities Oxfam and Child Poverty Action Group found that as many as 30% of 
foodbank users had had their benefit sanctioned16. A statistical study by Loopstra et 
al found that each 1% increase in the rate of benefit sanctions was associated with a 
significant increase of 0.09% in the prevalence of food parcel distribution17. 
x Debt and hardship: Sanctioned participants in research by Peters and Joyce18 
reported hardship, which made it difficult for them to meet household expenses, 
such as housing costs and utility bills. 
Also concerning is that disadvantaged groups with the most barriers to employment and 
employment programme participation are also the most likely to be sanctioned, a finding of 
'ƌŝŐŐƐĂŶĚǀĂŶƐ ?ƌĞǀŝĞǁŽĨĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƐƚƵĚŝĞƐŽĨƐĂŶĐƚŝŽŶƐ P 
A large body of research exploring the characteristics of sanctioned claimants has 
demonstrated that those most vulnerable to sanctions are the most disadvantaged. Strong 
links have been identified among barriers to employment and opportunity ʹ lack of education 
and work experience, disability and practical constraints, such as lack of transport. 
Exploration of demographic differences has also shown that young claimants, those with 
large families and those belonging to black and minority ethnic groups are at increased risk 
of sanctions19. 
  
                                                          
15 Hale (2014). ESA and the fate of the Work-Related Activity Group. Centre for Welfare Reform. 
https://www.mind.org.uk/media/933438/2014-support-not-sanctions-report.pdf  
16 Perry et al (2014). Emergency Use Only: Understanding and reducing the use of food banks in the UK. 
Oxfam. http://policy-practice.oxfam.org.uk/publications/emergency-use-only-understanding-and-reducing-
the-use-of-food-banks-in-the-uk-335731  
17 Loopstra, R., Reeves, A., Taylor-Robinson, D., Barr, B., McKee, M., & Stuckler, D. (2015). Austerity, 
sanctions, and the rise of food banks in the UK. BMJ, 350, h1775. 
18 Peters, M. and L. Joyce (2006) A review of the JSA sanctions regime: summary research findings. Department 
for Work and Pensions Research Report No. 313. Leeds, DWP  
19 Griggs and Evans (2010). 
A vision for sanction-free employment programmes in Scotland 
There is a strong evidence base to suggest that mandating benefit recipients to employment 
programmes under threat of sanction does not achieve positive, long-term outcomes in 
terms of helping non-employed people into sustained employment. On the contrary, there 
is some evidence to suggest that it may have the opposite effect in certain cases, and also 
negative effects on a range of factors that have an important influence on returns to work, 
health and wellbeing, for example. Further, mandatory participation appears to be 
particularly ineffectual for benefit recipients with multiple and complex barriers to work, 
and it is these recipients who will make up the bulk of referrals to Scottish employment 
programmes. 
Therefore, this report recommends that when Scottish employment programmes start to 
operate in April 2017, these should be voluntary as far as possible. Whilst the Scotland Act 
(2016) does not devolve the sanctions system, the operation of that system relies heavily on 
employment programme providers reporting sanctionable behaviour to the DWP so that 
they can apply sanctions. The Scottish Government could therefore oblige Scottish 
programme providers not to share such information with the DWP. This would insulate tens 
of thousands of non-employed Scots from sanctions every year. With the average benefit 
sanction for JSA recipients being around £53020 and an average of 13,000 Scottish benefit 
recipients being sanctioned as part of employment programmes every year, such a move 
could put approximately £7m21 back in the hands of poor Scots. 
There is a clear precedent for this kind of arrangement in the history of devolved 
employment programmes. The Scottish and Welsh governments have refused to co-operate 
ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƐĂŶĐƚŝŽŶƐƌĞŐŝŵĞŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŶŐŽŶƚŚĞh<ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ^ŬŝůůƐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůŝƚǇand Sector 
Based Work Academies programmes22 23. Both governments instructed providers of 
devolved skills programmes not to report non-attendance to the DWP24. 
 
                                                          
20 Tinson (2015). The Rise of Sanctioning in Great Britain. 
http://npi.org.uk/files/1314/3444/4908/Sanction_report_1606.pdf  
21 This estimate does not include ESA claimants, for whom an average sanction value is not available. £7m 
would therefore be a slight underestimate. 
22 Skills Development Scotland (2016). Employability Fund Frequently asked questions 2015/16: 
https://www.skillsdevelopmentscotland.co.uk/media/1146/employability-fund-faq-15-16-14-december-
2015.pdf  P “dŚĞdƌĂŝŶŝŶŐůůŽǁĂŶĐĞŝƐůŝŶŬĞĚƚŽďĞŶĞĨŝƚƌƵůĞƐĂŶĚ^ĐŽƚƚŝƐŚ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚŚĂƐĂŐƌĞĞĚƚŚĞƉŽůŝĐǇ
with DWP. Scottish Government policy is clear that they will not support any action that may result in 
ƐĂŶĐƚŝŽŶƐŽŶƚŚĞŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ?
23 ^ĐŽƚƚŝƐŚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĂĚǀŝĐĞƚŽ^W/ĞŝŶƵŐƵƐƚ ? ? ? ?ŝƐƚŚĂƚ “should the customer not attend or complete the 
EF [Employability Fund] funded provision, SDS [Skills Development Scotland] and their contracted providers do 
not provide information to support any conditionality action by DWP.  For administrative purposes, they will 
ďĞĂĚǀŝƐĞĚƚŚĞĐƵƐƚŽŵĞƌŝƐŶŽůŽŶŐĞƌĂŶ&ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚ ?ďƵƚŶŽĨƵƌƚŚĞƌŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶŝƐƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚ ? ?
24 Learning and Work Institute (2016). Scotland's Future Employment Services. 
http://www.learningandwork.org.uk/sites/niace_en/files/resources/Scotlands%20future%20employment%20s
ervices%20final%20report.pdf  
